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Least Square Approximations and Linear Values
of Cooperative Game
Ulrich FAIGLE and Michel GRABISCH
Abstract Many important values for cooperative games are known to arise from
least square optimization problems. The present investigation develops an optimiza-
tion framework to explain and clarify this phenomenon in a general setting. The
main result shows that every linear value results from some least square approxima-
tion problem and that, conversely, every least square approximation problem with
linear constraints yields a linear value. This approach includes and extends previous
results on so-called least square values and semivalues in the literature. In particu-
lar, it is demonstrated how known explicit formulas for solutions under additional
assumptions easily follow from the general results presented here.
1 Introduction
Approximation of high-dimensional quantities or complicated functions by simpler
functions with linear properties from low-dimensional spaces has countless appli-
cations in physics, economics, operations research etc. In these applications, the
quality of the approximation is usually measured by the Gaussian principle of least
squared error, which is also the guiding optimality criterion in the present investi-
gation. Our study addresses a particular case of such an approximation context with
many applications in different fields related to operations research, namely decision
theory, game theory and the theory of pseudo-Boolean functions.
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Where N is a finite set with n = |N | elements and collection 2N of subsets, a set
function v : 2N → R assigns to every subset of N a real number, and is by definition
of exponential complexity (in n). Identifying subsets of N with their characteristic
(incidence) vectors (and thus 2N with {0, 1}n), a set function can be viewed as a
so-called pseudo-Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → R (cf. Hammer and Rudeanu
[12]). Of particular interest are those set functions which vanish on the empty set,
since they represent cooperative TU games with N being the set of players and the
quantities v(S) expressing the benefit created by the cooperation of the members
of S ⊆ N (see, e.g., Peleg and Sudhölter [15]). Under the additional stipulation of
monotonicity, i.e., the property that v(S) ≤ v(T ) holds whenever S ⊆ T , one arrives
at so-called capacities, which are a fundamental tool in the analysis of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty (cf. Schmeidler [18]) or relative to several criteria (Grabisch
and Labreuche [8])1.
Being of exponential complexity, a natural question is to try to approximate gen-
eral set functions by simpler functions, the simplest being the additive set functions,
which are completely determined by the values they take on the n singleton sets {i}
and are thus of linear complexity (in n). In the field of pseudo-Boolean functions,
the question has been addressed by Hammer and Holzman [10] with respect to lin-
ear and quadratic approximations, while approximation of degree k was studied by
Grabisch et al. [9]. In decision theory, linear approximation amounts to the approx-
imation of a capacity µ by a probability measure P (an additive capacity satisfying
the additional constraint that P(N ) = 1).
In game theory, the approximation of a game v by an additive game (equivalently
by a (payoff) vector in RN ) is related to the concept of value or solution of a game:
given v, find x ∈ RN such that ∑i∈N xi = v(N ) and the xi represent as faithfully as
possible the contribution of the individual players i to the total benefit v(N ). A very
natural approach for a value is to define it as the best least square approximation of v,
under the constraint
∑
i∈N xi = v(N ), the approximation being possibly weighted.
Such values are called least square values. An early and important contribution to
this cooperative solution concept is due to Charnes et al. [2], who gave the general
solution for the weighted approximation with nonnegative weights, and exhibited
the well-known Shapley value [19] as a least square value. Ruiz et al. [16], for
example, generalized this approach and derived further values from least square
approximation.
The aim of this paper is a general view on the set function approximation problem
by placing it in the context of quadratic optimization and bringing well-known tools
of convex analysis to bear on the problem. This approach generalizes existing results
and points to interesting connections. Our formulation will remain general, although
we will adopt most of the time the notation and ideas from cooperative game theory,
due to the great interest in this field towards values and how to obtain them.
1 For a general treatment of set functions, games, capacities and their application in decision mak-
ing, see [7].
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Main result:
Linear values and least square values for cooperative games represent two sides of
the same coin: every least square problem under linear constraints yields a linear
value having the inessential game property (cf. Section 3) and every such linear
value arises as a least square value.
The presentation is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the mathematical
model and Section 3 reviews linear values in the present context. Section 4 concen-
trates on least square values, and establishes explicit formulas under mild conditions
on the weights used in the approximation and generalizes the approach to the Shap-
ley value and to an optimization problem given in Ruiz et al. [16]. We remark that,
interestingly, the weights do not necessarily have to be all positive in our model.
Finally, we show in Section 5 how Weber’s [22] so-called probabilistic values arise
naturally in the present context.
2 Least square approximations and linear operators
For integers k,m ≥ 1, we denote by Rk the vector space of all k-dimensional (col-
umn) vectors and by Rm×k the vector space of all (m × k)-matrices M = [mi j] with
coefficients mi j . Generally, MT denotes the transpose of a matrix (or coefficient
vector) M .
Let Q = [qi j] be an arbitrary positive definite symmetric (k × k)-matrix with
coefficients qi j and recall that Q defines an inner product via
〈x |y〉Q = xTQy =
k∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
qi j xiyj
with the associated Q-norm ‖x‖Q =
√〈x |x〉Q on Rk . Note that the choice Q = I of
the identity matrix I yields the usual Euclidian norm ‖x‖ = ‖x‖Q.
Fix now a matrix A ∈ Rm×k , a linear map b : Rk → Rm as well as a linear map
c : Rk → Rk . For any v ∈ Rk , denote by vˆ = vˆ(A, b, c) the optimal solution of the
quadratic minimization problem
min
Ax=b(v)
‖c(v) − x‖2Q . (1)
So, if the system Ax = b(v) of linear equations has at least one solution, vˆ is the
(uniquely determined) best approximation of c(v) in the solution space of Ax = b(v)
relative to the norm ‖ · ‖Q.
The following observation is the key for our analysis of linear values. We give
its short and concise proof in terms of the well-known Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
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optimality conditions2, from which we will derive explicit formulas for linear values
in Section 4.
Lemma 1 Assume that Ax = b(v) has a solution for every v ∈ Rk and that the map
c : Rk → Rk is linear. Then v 7→ vˆ is a well-defined linear operator.
Proof. Problem (1) is equivalent to the quadratic optimization problem
min
Ax=b(v)
1
2
xTQx − c′(v)T x, (2)
with c′ = Qc. Given that Q is positive definite, it is well-known that x is the unique
optimal solution for problem (2) if and only if there is a vector y such that the
associated KKT-conditions
Qx + AT y = c′(v)
Ax = b(v) (3)
are satisfied. Since b and c′ are linear functions in v, one immediately deduces from
(3) that also the optimal solutions of (1) are linear functions in v.

As a final remark, it is easy to see that every linear operator arises from some
parametrized quadratic minimization problem of type (1). The game theoretically
important observation is the opposite observation: in the context of cooperative
games (see next sections), quadratic approximation problems typically give rise to
linear operators on the space of cooperative games.
3 Values of cooperative games
Let N be a set of players of finite cardinality n = |N | and let N be the collection
of non-empty subsets S ⊆ N . A cooperative TU game is a function v : N → R
(which is usually thought to be extended to all subsets of N via v(∅) = 0). So the
set G = RN of all cooperative TU games on N is a vector space and isomorphic to
Rk with k = |N | = 2n − 1.
The additive (cooperative) games correspond to those members x ∈ RN that
satisfy the homogeneous system of linear equations
x(S) −
∑
i∈S
x({i}) = 0 (S ∈ N ) (4)
and one may be interested in the approximation of a game v ∈ G by an additive
game with certain properties. More general approximations might be of interest.
For example, the linear constraints
2 see Faigle et al. [5] or any other textbook on mathematical optimization
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i∈N
x({i}) = v(N ) (5)∑
S∈N ′
x(S) =
∑
S∈N ′
v(S) (6)
for some subcollection N ′ ⊆ N would stipulate an approximation of v by a game
that induces an efficient value (the first equality) and, furthermore, preserves the
total sum of the v(S) for some specific subsets (second equality). Observe that all
equalities (4) to (6) are of the form Ax = b(v) with b linear in v. Hence, least
square approximation problems of a game v (or of its image by a linear map c) by
a game satisfying some of the above equalities (e.g., an additive game) fall under
the case covered by (1). Then Lemma 1 applies, from which it follows that such
approximations are linear in v.
In cooperative game theory, a function Φ : G → RN is called a value for G. It
is well known that there is an isomorphism between additive games v and vectors
x in RN , letting v({i}) = xi , i ∈ N . Consequently, values can be seen as additive
games, and Lemma 1 shows that least square approximations of games by additive
games yield values which are linear on G. Moreover, supposing c to be the identity
map, uniqueness of the solution of (1) implies that the induced linear value vˆ has
the inessential game property:
Φ has the inessential game property if v additive implies Φi (v) = v({i}),∀i ∈ N,
that is, Φ(v) ≡ v in the sense of the above defined isomorphism.
This discussion leads us naturally to the concept of least square values, developed
in the next section.
4 Least square values
A least square value is a value obtained as the optimal solution of a least square
problem of the following type:
min
x∈RN
∑
S∈N
αS (v(S) − x(S))2 s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ), (7)
where we set x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi . So (7) asks for the best (α-weighted) least square
approximation of a game v by an additive game x under the additional efficiency
constraint x(N ) = v(N ). We recognize here problem (1) with c being the identity
operator, Q a diagonal matrix, and the constraints Ax = b(v) being given by (4) and
(5).
This problem has a long history. Hammer and Holzman ([10])3 studied both the
above version and the unconstrained version with equal weights (αS = 1 ∀S), and
3 later published in [11]
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proved that the optimal solutions of the unconstrained version yield the Banzhaf
value [1] (see also Section 5 below). More general versions of the unconstrained
problem were solved by Grabisch et al. [9] with the approximation being relative
to the space of k-additive games (i.e., games whose Möbius transform vanishes for
subsets of size greater than k)4.
In 1988, Charnes et al. [2] gave a solution for the case with the coefficients
αS being uniform (i.e., αS = αT whenever |S | = |T |) and strictly positive. As a
particular case, the Shapley value was shown to result from the coefficient choice
αS = αs =
(
n − 2
s − 1
)
=
(n − 2)!
(s − 1)!(n − 1 − s)! (s = |S |). (8)
In 1998, Ruiz et al. [16] analyzed problem (7) in a more general approach for
uniform and nonnegative weights. They also noted several properties of least square
values (like linearity) and even characterized them. Kultti and Salonen [13] gener-
alized the results of Ruiz et al. by considering a distance minimization problem for
an arbitrary norm under additivity and efficiency, which amounts to considering our
problem (1) with c being the identity and constraints (4) and (5). One of their major
results is that Φ is a linear and efficient value having the inessential game property
if and only if it is the unique solution of a certain distance minimization problem.
Later, Tanino [21] exploited the results of Kultti and Salonen by proposing to per-
form optimization using the Möbius representation of games (i.e., to work in the
basis of unanimity games). Thanks to this, Tanino exhibited the norm yielding any
sharing values (i.e., produced by a sharing of the dividends (Möbius transform)),
also known as selectope elements (see Derks, Haller and Peters [3]).
In this section, we will first present a general framework for dealing with such
situations and then illustrate it with the example of regular weight approximations
and probabilistic values.
4.1 Weighted approximation
For the sake of generality, consider a general linear subspace F ⊆ RN of dimension
k = dimF , relative to which the approximation will be made.
Let W = [wST ] ∈ RN×N be a given symmetric matrix of weights wST . Let
c : RN → RN be a linear function and consider, for any game v, the optimization
problem
min
u∈F
(v − u)TW (v − u) + cT (v − u) with c = c(v), (9)
which is equivalent with
min
u∈F
uTWu − c˜Tu, (10)
4 see also Ding [4], and Marichal and Mathonet [14]
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where c˜ ∈ RN has the components c˜S = cS + 2∑T wST vT . A further simplification
is possible by choosing a basis B = {b1, . . . , bk } for F . With the identification
x = (x1, . . . , xk ) ∈ Rk ←→ u =
k∑
i=1
xibi ∈ F ,
problem (10) becomes
min
x∈Rk
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
qi j xi x j −
k∑
i=1
ci xi (11)
with the coefficients
qi j =
∑
S
∑
T
wST bi (S)bj (T ) and ci =
∑
S
c˜Sbi (S).
Note that c : RN → Rk is a linear function in v.
Let A ∈ Rm×k be a constraint matrix and b : RN → Rm a linear function such
that Ax = b(v) has a solution for every v ∈ RN . If Q = [qi j] ∈ Rk×k is positive
definite, the problem
min
x∈Rk
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
qi j xi x j −
k∑
i=1
ci xi s.t. Ax = b (12)
has the form (2), and therefore by Lemma 1 has a unique optimal solution x∗ which
is linear in v.
In the model (7), for example, F is the space C of all additive games and has
dimension n. The matrix W is diagonal with the diagonal elements wSS = αS . If
αS > 0 holds for all S, then W is positive definite and the linearity of the implied
value v 7→ vˆ follows directly from Lemma 1.
Otherwise, let us choose for B the basis of unanimity games ζi , i ∈ N , for C (like
in Tanino [21]), where
ζi (S) =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 if i < S.
The associated matrix Q = [qi j] in model (7) has the coefficients
qi j =
∑
S∈N
αSζi (S)ζ j (S) =
∑
S3{i, j }
αS . (13)
For establishing a linear value, it suffices that Q be positive definite, which is possi-
ble even when some of the αS are negative (see Examples 4.1 and 4.2 below).
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4.2 Regular weights
While Lemma 1 guarantees the existence of linear values resulting from approxi-
mation, explicit formulas can be given under additional assumptions on the weights.
Restricting ourselves to objectives of type∑
S∈N
αS (vS − uS )2 +
∑
S∈N
cSuS,
we propose a simple framework that nevertheless includes all the cases treated in
the literature so far. We say that the weights αS are regular if the resulting matrix Q
has just two types of coefficients qi j , i.e., if there are real numbers p, q such that
qi j =
{
q if i = j
p if i , j.
Example Assume that the weights αS are uniform and set α( |S |) = αS . Then
formula (13) yields
qi j =
n∑
s=2
(
n − 2
s − 2
)
α(s) and qii =
n∑
s=1
(
n − 1
s − 1
)
α(s)
holds for all i , j. So Q = [qi j] is regular. 
Lemma 2 Let Q = [qii] ∈ Rk×k be regular with q = qii and p = qi j for i , j. Then
Q is positive definite if and only if q > p ≥ 0.
Proof. For any x ∈ Rk , we have after some algebra
xTQx = (q − p)
k∑
i=1
x2i + px
2
where x =
∑n
i=1 xi , which makes the claim of the Lemma obvious. 
Note that our model allows for possibly negative uniform coefficients, as shown
in the following example.
Example Let n = 3. We get p = α2 + α3 and q = α1 + 2α2 + α3. Letting α > 0, the
following vectors (α1, α2, α3) lead to a positive definite matrix Q:
(0, α, 0), (α, 0, α), (0, α,−α), etc.
For the remainder of this section, let Q ∈ RN×N be a regular matrix with param-
eters q > p ≥ 0, c ∈ RN a vector and g ∈ R a scalar. Setting 1T = (1, 1, . . . , 1), the
optimization problem
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min
x∈RN
xTQx − cT x s.t. 1T x = x(N ) = g (14)
has a unique optimal solution x∗ ∈ RN . Moreover, there is a unique scalar z∗ ∈ R
such that (x∗, z∗) is the unique solution of the associated KKT-system
Qx − z1 = c/2
1T x = g. (15)
Verifying this KKT-system, the proof of the following explicit solution formulas
is straightforward.
Theorem 1 If Q is regular, the solution (x∗, z∗) of the KKT-system (15) is:
z∗ = (2(q + (n − 1)p)g − C)/n (with C = c1T = ∑i∈N ci)
x∗i = (ci + z
∗ − 2pg)/(2q − 2p) (i ∈ N ).
If Q is furthermore positive definite, then x∗ is an optimal solution for (14).

In the case of uniform weights α(s), the formulas in Theorem 1 yield the for-
mulas derived by Charnes et al. [2] for problem (7). To demonstrate the scope of
Theorem 1, let us look at the extremal problem5 studied by Ruiz et al. [17]
min
x∈RN
∑
S⊆N
mSd(x, S)2 s.t. x(N ) = v(N ), (16)
where mS > 0 and
d(x, S) =
v(S) − x(S)
|S | −
v(N \ S) − x(N \ S)
n − |S | .
Letting v∗(S) = v(N ) − v(N \ S) and
v(S) =
(n − |S |)v(S) + |S |v∗(S)
n
(and thus nv(N ) = v(N )), we find that problem (16) becomes
min
x∈RN
∑
S⊆N
αS (v(S) − x(S))2 s.t. x(N ) = nv(N ).
with αS = n2mS (|S |2(n − |S |)2)−1. Because v 7→ v and v 7→ g(v) = nv(N ) are
linear mappings, the optimal solutions of (16) yield an efficient linear value for any
choice of parameters mS such that the associated matrix Q is positive definite.
5 see also Sun et al. [20] for similar problems
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If furthermore the weights mS (and hence the αS) are uniform, Q is regular and
the optimal solution can be explicitly computed from the formulas of Theorem 1.
5 Probabilistic values
Weber [22] introduced the idea of a probabilistic value arising as the expected
marginal contribution of players relative to a probability distribution on the coali-
tions. For example, a semivalue is a probabilistic value relative to probabilities that
are equal on coalitions of equal cardinality.
For our purposes, it suffices to think of the marginal contribution of an element
i ∈ N as a linear functional ∂i : G × N → R, where ∂vi (S) is interpreted as the
marginal contribution of i ∈ N to the coalition S ⊆ N relative to the characteristic
function v.
Probabilistic values can be studied quite naturally in the context of weighted
approximations. Indeed, let p be an arbitrary probability distribution on N . Then
the expected marginal contribution of i ∈ N relative to the game v is
E(∂vi ) =
∑
S⊆N
∂vi (S)pS .
Let µi ∈ R be an estimate value for the marginal contribution of i ∈ N . Then the
expected observed deviation from µi is
σ(µi) =
√∑
S∈N
pS (∂vi (S) − µi)2.
A well-known fact in statistics says that the deviation function µi 7→ σ(µi) has the
unique minimizer µ = E(∂vi ), which can also be immediately deduced from the
KKT conditions for the least square problem
min
µ∈R
∑
S∈N
pS (∂vi (S) − µ)2.
The above problem is a special case of (1), with c(v) = ∂vi , Q the diagonal matrix
with diagonal terms pS , while the approximation subspace is just R and does not
depend on v.
The values of Shapley and Banzhaf.
Shapley’s [19] model assumes that player i contributes to a coalition S only if i ∈ S
holds and that, in this case, i’s marginal contribution is evaluated as
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∂vi (S) = v(S) − v(S \ i).
So only coalitions in Ni = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S} need to be considered. In order to speak
about the ”average marginal contribution”, the model furthermore assumes:
(i) The cardinalities |X | of the coalitions X ∈ Ni are distributed uniformly.
(ii) The coalitions X ∈ Ni of the same cardinality |X | = s are distributed uniformly.
Under these probabilistic assumptions, the coalition S ∈ Ni of cardinality |S | = s
occurs with probability
pS =
1
n
· 1(
n−1
s−1
) = (s − 1)!(n − s)!
n!
, (17)
which exhibits the Shapley value as a probabilistic (and hence approximation) value:∑
S∈Ni
pS[v(S) − v(S \ i)] =
∑
S∈N
pS[v(S) − v(S \ i)] = ΦShi (v).
REMARK. Among the probabilistic values, the Shapley value can also be charac-
terized as the one with the largest entropy (Faigle and Voss [6]).
In contrast to the Shapley model, the assumption that all coalitions in Ni are
equally likely assigns to any coalition S ∈ Ni the probability
pS =
1
2n−1
(18)
with the Banzhaf value [1] as the associated probabilistic value:∑
S∈Ni
pS[v(S) − v(S \ i)] =
∑
S∈N
pS[v(S) − v(S \ i)] = Bvi .
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